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The Constitutional Framework 
Limiting Compelled Voice Exemplars: 
Exploration of the Current 
Constitutional Boundaries of 
Governmental Power Over a 
Criminal Defendant* 
"Bills of Rights give assurance to the individual of the 
preservation of his liberty. They do not define the liberty 
they promise. "1 
"In a split decision, a three judge panel ruled that 
Richard Olvera s constitutional rights were violated when 
the trial judge ordered him to stand five feet from the jury 
and utter the bank robbers command, 'Give me all of 
your money' and, in Spanish, 'dame tu dinero. '"2 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Olvera, the Ninth Circuit held that forcing Richard 
Olvera to repeat phrases heard by a witness during a bank robbery, for 
which Olvera was on trial, violated his guaranteed presumption of 
innocence.3 The Ninth Circuit attempted to explain how the particular 
combination of facts and procedures in the Olvera case invoked 
constitutional protection. The court justified its ruling against an 
* I would like to give special thanks to Professor Cynthia Lee and Justice 
Richard Huffman for their assistance on this Comment. 
I. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, reprinted in 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CORTEX 251, 311 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 
1947). 
2. Jim Doyle, Judge's Order to Talk Leads to Reversal, S.F. CHRON., July 28, 
1994, at A23. 
3. 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). 
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adamant dissent and set its decision apart from other factually analogous 
circuit court decisions.4 
Olvera is just one example of the ongoing difficulties courts face in 
defining the constitutional boundaries of compelled evidence production 
and, in particular, compelled voice exemplars.5 The courts must grapple 
with a number of constitutional and statutory issues, each of which 
might prohibit a particular exemplar under a particular set of circum-
stances. In addition, courts must balance important policy considerations 
applicable to compelled evidence situations. On the one hand, courts 
must recognize the important governmental interest in protecting the 
safety of the citizenry through conviction and incarceration of criminals, 
and the need to rely on witness identification for this purpose.6 On the 
other hand, this interest must be tempered by the court's duty to protect 
and preserve the individual liberties on which the United States was built 
and continues to be based.7 
Unfortunately, treatment of voice exemplar issues by modern courts 
seems to fall short of adequately protecting individual rights. The 
problem, in large part, is a result of the formal application of constitu-
tional standards, instead of considering the actual effect of a particular 
state practice on individual rights. A trial court's decision to allow or 
prohibit a compelled voice exemplar in a case is not merely a procedural 
matter, and is potentially the most important decision the court makes in 
a trial. 8 The court's decision is of tantamount importance because of 
the particular effect that witness' identification testimony can have on 
the jury, especially if the compelled speech mimics words used at a 
crime scene.9 The importance of the court's decision concerning an 
exemplar becomes clearer still once the complete ramifications of a 
court's decision to allow the exemplar are recognized. 
4. See id. 
5. A compelled voice exemplar is a particular word or series of words or phrases 
uttered by a defendant against his will, by command of the court. 
6. However, the Supreme Court has not given carte blanche to the state to use 
witness identification testimony in all cases, noting that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). 
7. Id.; see also ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 80 (1955) 
("This country was built on individual liberty. It will never be saved in the long run by 
submerging individual rights in the quest for absolute safety for the state."). 
8. See Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 
12 WM. & MARYL. REV. 235,238 (1970) (faulty identifications may pose the "greatest 
single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished"). 
9. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in 
Connection with Pretrial Identification Procedures: an Analysis and a Proposal, 79 KY. 
L.J. 259,315 (1991). 
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If a voice exemplar is determined to be merely evidence, versus a 
constitutionally protected right, the defendant is placed between the 
proverbial "rock and a hard place." At that point, the defendant may be 
compelled by the state to give an exemplar mimicking any words the 
government tells the defendant to repeat. 10 The government's prefer-
ence seems to be to have the defendant repeat the words allegedly stated 
during the commission of the alleged crime. These words tend to be 
threatening or menacing in nature, and requiring a defendant to repeat 
these words in court in front of the jury is conceivably the most 
prejudicial method of establishing a voice identification possible. 11 
Despite this, the defendant does not even have the right to diminish the 
potential prejudice by offering a neutral 12 voice exemplar for identifica-
tion purposes. 13 Even more troubling is the practice of allowing an 
exemplar to be compelled, despite the fact that the relevant witness has 
identified the defendant in court visually and has stated that a voice 
exemplar is unnecessary. 14 Such a practice places into doubt the actual 
reason for the compelled exemplar. Further, in all jurisdictions, the 
defendant's failure to produce the exemplar will be admissible as 
IO. See 2 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED§ 6.5, at 
251-55 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994). 
11. Having the defendant utter threatening and menacing words places an aura of 
criminality around the defendant, strongly suggesting to the jury that the defendant is 
guilty. "It is hard for me to conceive of a more prejudicial method of establishing a 
voice identification." United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, C.J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981). 
12. Such a substitution cannot be made without court permission. See In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 1985). "Neutral" in this 
context refers to the words spoken, not the manner in which they are spoken. For 
example, a court might allow the defendant to read an article from a magazine in lieu 
of restating the phrases spoken during the commission of the charged criminal activity. 
The defendant's restating of menacing words in a non-threatening manner does not 
overcome the prejudice. The use of such words acts to recreate the scene of the crime 
in the minds of the jury and to put the defendant in that scene. The prejudice comes 
from this effect, not the tone of voice. 
13. Id. (grand jury has broad discretion to compel verbatim voice exemplar and 
defendant's offer of a neutral exemplar does not constitute sufficient compliance). 
14. State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (despite the 
witness' statement that no voice exemplar was necessary, the trial court's demand that 
the defendant provide an exemplar was still within its discretion); United States v. 
Leone, 823 F .2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1987) ( despite fact that witness had already identified 
defendant, the forcing of the defendant to repeat words uttered during the commission 
of the crime did not violate defendant's rights). 
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probative evidence of consciousness of guilt,15 even if the defendant 
chooses to exercise her right to remain silent. 16 
In contrast, the defendant is given no right to present a voice exemplar 
as evidence, in the absence of the defendant's testimony,17 unlike other 
types of exemplar evidence which the defendant may offer without 
submitting to cross-examination. 18 The formal basis for such an 
inequity is that the defendant could easily fake a voice exemplar without 
penalty, since the prosecution would have no opportunity to expose the 
trickery through questioning. 19 However, the defendant is equally 
capable of faking a state compelled exemplar without being subject to 
cross-examination, a problem that has not yet been addressed by the 
courts. Under the trickery logic, state compelled exemplars should 
likewise be excluded. 
Regardless, the disparate treatment of compelled exemplars ignores the 
real impact that the isolated performance of the exemplar will have on 
the trier of fact. The prosecution, by use of the state's judicial power, 
is allowed to force the defendant to repeat words allegedly said during 
a criminal activity, even if the defendant has exercised her constitutional 
right to remain silent. The defendant has no right to substitute neutral 
words or to use any other means to lessen the prejudice of this 
procedure. Yet, if a defendant wishes to volunteer a voice exemplar for 
witness identification purposes, she may do so only by abandoning her 
right to remain silent and by submitting to full cross-examination. In 
effect, the government is given all the benefits and none of the burdens, 
15. 1 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
§ 14.13, at 457-58 (4th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994). While using the fact that a defendant 
exercised a right against that defendant would be unconstitutional under Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), no such prohibition is applicable to exemplars as the 
defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to provide one. South Dakota v. Neville, 
459 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1983). 
16. United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 35-36 (6th Cir.) (upholding instruction 
that jurors could infer defendant's consciousness of guilt from his refusal to provide a 
court ordered voice exemplar), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
17. People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 728 (N.Y. 1988). In Scarola, the prosection 
witness testified under cross-examination that the robber had no speech problems or 
unique voice mannerisms. Id. at 730. The defendant, who had a profound speech 
impediment, was nonetheless barred from offering a voice exemplar, unless he consented 
to be subject to complete cross-examination. Id. at 731; see also United States v. 
Esdaille, 769 F.2d 104, 107 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985) (due process 
does not require court to allow defendant with a heavy Caribbean accent to offer his 
voice as evidence because of the suspect nature of the exemplar). 
18. E.g., United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1985) (trial court erred in 
refusing defendant's request to exhibit the tattoos on his hands to the jury after witness 
testimony that witness did not recall any distinguishing features about bank robber's 
hands). 
19. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d at 733; Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 107-08. 
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because the same evidence that is allowed the prosecution is denied to 
the defense.20 
The only recourse left to the defendant is to request that the witness 
be given multiple voice exemplars to choose from,21 in an attempt to 
minimize the prejudice arising from the compulsion and the words used. 
However, the defendant has no absolute right to this protection.22 In 
most cases, trial courts continuously refuse to allow any mitigating effort 
by the defendant,23 despite the minimal disruptive effect of allowing the 
protection.24 
This Comment seeks to provide a comprehensive guide to the current 
constitutional framework surrounding in-court compelled voice 
exemplars. The express purpose is to explore the current framework of 
United States jurisprudence concerning exemplars for use by legal 
practitioners in the criminal field. Part I addresses the self-incrimination 
privilege as applied to exemplars. Despite Supreme Court decisions that 
radically limit the application of the self-incrimination privilege, self-
incrimination continues to have particularized application in protecting 
defendants from compelled evidence. More importantly, self-incrimina-
tion seems to be the most likely basis on which an exemplar would be 
prohibited, a fact reflected by the solitary focus of scholarly research on 
the privilege against self-incrimination when considering the constitution-
20. At least one court has recognized the implication of such disparate treatment, 
holding that if the state could have ordered the defendant to speak without violating 
constitutional guarantees, then principles of due process require that the defendant be 
allowed to provide non-testimonial speech without exposing himself to cross-examina-
tion. State of Louisiana v. Tillett, 35 l So. 2d I I 53 (La. I 977). 
2!. See, e.g., United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 938 (1982) (counsel may request court permission to seat multiple people at 
defense table to test witness identification, but doing so without court's awareness may 
constitute criminal contempt). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893, 903-04 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(refusal of defendant's request for an in-court identification lineup was not an abuse of 
discretion). 
23. Id.; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 
l 985) (grand jury refusal to accept a neutral voice exemplar was within its discretion); 
United States v. Edward, 439 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1971) (trial court's refusal of 
defendant's request to sit among court spectators during testimony of identifying 
witnesses was not an abuse of discretion). 
24. See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987). 
353 
ality of compelled voice exemplars.25 Additionally, defense counsel 
continue to argue the applicability of the privilege to the prohibition of 
exemplars. Thus, despite the current Supreme Court limitations on the 
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to exemplars, a full 
analysis of self-incrimination doctrine is essential to a complete analysis 
of constitutional limitations on state compelled exemplars. 
Part II of this Comment considers the due process limitations the 
courts have applied to exemplars. Despite an ongoing dispute between 
the circuits as to whether due process acts to limit compelled exemplar 
situations, the Supreme Court has not yet provided guidance in this 
constitutional area. As with self-incrimination analysis, the historical 
foundations of due process are included because of their importance in 
consideration of the current application of constitutional rights. 
Finally, Part III will briefly consider other constitutional and 
evidentiary limitations that have been argued, or might be argued, in the 
context of exemplars. Even though none of these has yet received wide 
recognition or support, each is worthy of consideration for its potential 
application in certain contexts, and as part of a complete study of the 
current constitutional boundaries of state compelled exemplars. 
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AS A PROTECTION AGAINST STATE COMPELLED 
EVIDENCE AND EXEMPLARS 
A. History 
The origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is seen in the 
resistance against the judicial system of the Stuart monarchy,26 which 
occurred in the early to middle seventeenth century. In particular, the 
notorious trial of John Lilburne,27 in which the defendant's adamant 
25. See Russell J. Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, IO V AND. L. REV. 485 ( I 957). 
26. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 25, at 486-89; John H. Wigmore, The 
Privilege Against Self-Crimination; Its History, 15 HARV. L. REV. 610, 624-26 (1902). 
One of the most striking of the methods was the ex officio oath, utilized by the 
ecclesiastical courts in pursuit of enemies of the Established Church. A judge, by virtue 
of his office, had the authority to place a defendant under oath and proceed to interrogate 
him. This system allowed the Church, on mere suspicion alone, to compel anyone to 
provide proof against himself. DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 
304-05 (1976). 
27. Lilbume was accused of importing subversive books from Holland and of 
treason. Despite being jailed and severely beaten, he refused to take the oath. For a 
detailed discussion, see Harold W. Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire, 
3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213 (1952). 
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refusal to testify was ultimately recognized as legitimate by the court, 
has been focused on as the judicial origin point of the right against self-
incrimination. 28 From the resistance movements of the 1630's and 
1640's, the privilege continued to be recognized in England up through 
the Glorious Revolution period.29 
Overall, criminal procedure in the American colonies mirrored 
criminal procedure under English common law, including the right 
against compelled self-incrimination.30 By the mid-eighteenth century, 
the right was firmly established throughout the colonies.31 In 1776, a 
self-incrimination clause was included in the Virginia Bill of Rights,32 
followed by similar inclusion of clauses in many other state constitu-
tions.33 Influenced by these examples, James Madison's drafting of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1789 included a 
guarantee against being compelled to "be a witness" against oneself.34 
Recent historical studies of the privilege against self-incrimination 
have provided new insight into the actual role of the privilege. 35 This 
new approach recognizes the "tradition" of the privilege as addressed by 
28. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 301-13 (1968). 
29. See id. at 301-13. 
30. Id. at 371-76. 
3 I. Id. at 368-404. 
32. THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 1776, § 8, reprinted in THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909 (Benjamin P. Poore, 2d. 1878). 
33. E.g., A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776, art. IX, reprinted in Poore, supra note 32, at 1541-42; 
CONSTITUTION OF MARYLAND, 1776, art. xx, reprinted in id. at 817-18; THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, 1780, art. XII, reprinted in id. at 958. 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Madison's use of the phrase "be a witness" differed 
from the terms used in the state constitutions at that time, phrases like "furnish 
evidence," "secure evidence," or "compelled to give evidence." See, e.g., VIRGINIA BILL 
OF RIGHTS, 1776, art. VIII., reprinted in Poore, supra note 32, at 1909; VERMONT 
CONSTITUTION OF 1777, chap. I, art. X. Id. at 1860; MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION 
OF 1780, art. XII. Id. at 958; DELAWARE CONSTITUTION OF 1792, § 7. Id. at 279. The 
Supreme Court disregarded claims that the different wording was intended for a different 
meaning, stating that the various state and federal provisions, "however differently 
worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation." Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 n.6 (1967) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547, 584-85 (1892)). 
35. But see Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: The Role of the European !us Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990) 
(theorizing that the true origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is found in a 
blend of Roman and canon law). 
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Wigmore and Levy, but argues that the existence of the privilege was in 
form only.36 The actual criminal procedure of common law England 
and colonial America did not, as a practical matter, allow an individual 
defendant to utilize the privilege.37 Under English common law, the 
defendant could not compel witnesses on his behalf, nor was the 
defendant allowed the presence of counsel at the trial itself. 38 Like-
wise, many of the early colonial criminal procedural systems included 
these same limitations.39 Therefore, as a practical matter, defendants 
had to speak in their own defense and respond to prosecutorial evidence 
as it was given within this procedural system.40 A defendant's failure 
to speak in her own defense was tantamount to admitting unconditional 
guilt, as the trier of fact would be provided with no foundation on which 
to base a judgment of innocence. Thus, while the privilege against self-
incrimination provided a formal procedural protection against govern-
mental inquisitions,41 the notion of asserting the privilege individually 
36. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, 
Taking the Fifih: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994). 
37. The criminal procedure during this period has been categorized as the "accused 
speaks" trial system. Langbein, supra note 36, at J 054. This procedural system was 
depicted by Sir Thomas Smith in De Repub/ica Ang/arum, within the framework of a 
hypothetical trial circa 1565. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, bk. 2, ch. 23, 
at 114 (1982) (1st ed. 1583). The trial depicts the defendant in a continuing confronta-
tional dialogue with both the victim and the accusing witnesses. The defendant 
immediately responds to each item of evidence as well as to the questions posed to him 
by his accusers. Id. 
38. This rule lasted until 1696 in cases of treason and until 1836 in cases of 
felony. 7 & 8 Will. Ill, c.3 (1696); 6 & 7 Will. IV, c.114 (1836). At least one historian 
has interpreted these limitations in a positive light instead of as limitations, extolling the 
momentous changes made to the English common law trial practice by the public at that 
time. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 386 
(2d ed. I 936). 
39. For example, the colony of Massachusetts Bay banned paid counsel in its 
courts altogether. A COPPIE OF THE LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETS COLLONIE IN 
NEW ENGLAND, 1641, clause 26, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 46, 50-51 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). For a general 
discussion of pre-Constitutional American criminal procedure, see Moglen, supra note 
36, at I 090-94. 
40. John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal 
Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 221,223 (1991). 
41. The intent of the privilege was to prevent implementation of inquisitorial legal 
systems like those of the ecclesiastical courts and of the Star Chamber. In essence, the 
privilege provides a barrier to state implementation of an oath system or any other legal 
framework in which the accused would be required to assist the state in compiling 
evidence of the guilt of the accused. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 
(1956); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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was unthinkable within the common law criminal system during this 
period.42 
The traditional prohibition against counsel came into disfavor in the 
United States, and jurisdictions began to abandon the prohibition, 
primarily during the eighteenth century.43 The presence of counsel in 
courtroom proceedings changed the dynamics of trial procedure and 
increased the potential applicability of the privilege against self-
incrimination.44 As a practical matter, the increase in the use of 
defense counsel was the impetus that brought the formal recognition and 
practical application of the privilege together.45 
The addition of defense counsel changed the nature of trial proceed-
ings by increasing the adversarial character of the system.4 In an 
effort to zealously represent their clients, defense counsel began to focus 
on the "testing" of the prosecution's case and on narrowing the 
evidentiary sources available to the state.47 The result was a divergence 
among the courts over whether the scope of the privilege included 
compelled evidence production or exemplars.48 
B. The Role of the Courts 
The actual application of the privilege against self-incrimination has 
been primarily the product of judicial construction.49 The Court has 
42. Moglen, supra note 36, at I 089. 
43. See Beattie, supra note 40, at 226. Beattie found that the percentage of 
defense counsel appearances grew from 2.1 % in the l 770's to 20.2% in 1786, and to 
36.6% in 1795. Id. at 227 tbl. I. 
44. Langbein, supra note 36, at I 054; see also Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey 
of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983). 
45. See Langbein, supra note 36, at 1084; Moglen, supra note 36, at I 128-29. 
46. Langbein, supra note 36, at I 070-71. For an analysis of the origin and growth 
of the adversarial system, see Landsman, supra note 44. 
47. Id. 
48. One legal scholar wrote that "[ o ]n these questions the authorities are in such 
conflict that it is impossible to lay down any thoroughly established rule." JOHN E. 
TRACY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 151 (1952). Another interpreted the 
state of the law to be such "that an accused person cannot claim his privilege, when 
asked to rise or to uncover his face, [nor] the use of the personal effects of the accused 
as evidence," but that an accused person cannot generally be compelled to go farther 
than this. JOHN J. MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 436 (3d ed. 
1924). 
49. See id.; Lisa Tartallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End its 
Silence on the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEW 
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generally focused on its interpretation of the history and rolicies which 
constituted the impetus for the creation of the privilege.5 Considering 
the formal affinity shown for the right, both in English common law and 
by the founders of the Constitution, one might expect an expansive 
application of the privilege in United States courts. In fact, in early 
court treatment of the privilege, a majority of the courts that recognized 
the existence of a privilege51 utilized an expansive interpretative 
approach. 52 Still, a significant minority of early courts construed the 
privilege narrowly to include only content-based communications.53 
Further, Professor John Wigmore, in his first treatise on evidence, 
strongly advocated the narrow "testimonial" interpretative approach.54 
In addressing the contradictory interpretations of the breadth of the 
privilege, the modern Supreme Court has adhered to the more narrow 
interpretation that the privilege against self-incrimination protects no 
ENG. L. REV. 137 (1992). 
50. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (the privilege is based 
on an unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the choice between self-
accusation, perjury or contempt). The "core meaning" behind the privilege is the 
avoidance of the "cruel trilemma," a term which has been used to denote the 
impossibility of fairness within a legal system such as the Star Chamber. The defendant 
in such a system had three options, none of which were palatable. If the defendant 
remained silent, he would be punished for contempt. If he testified truthfully, the result 
would be self-incrimination and potential conviction on the substantive charge. And, if 
he testified falsely, he would be punished for perjury. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 595-96 (1990); Daniel J. Capra, Sobriety Tests and the Fifth Amendment, N.Y. L.J., 
Nov. 9, 1990, (Evidence) at 3. 
51. Before the United States Supreme Court held in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, several states allowed state prosecutors to comment on a 
defendant's failure to testify and permitted state courts to instruct jurors that they could 
draw inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46 (1947) (prosecutor comments), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (jury inferences), overruled by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964). 
52. State courts tended to interpret the right expansively, prohibiting the state from 
requiring of a defendant any act that might tend to incriminate him. See, e.g., Stokes 
v. State, 64 Tenn. 619, 621 (1875) (trial court prohibited from requiring defendant to 
place his foot in a pan of mud brought into court); Turman v. State, 95 S.W. 533 (1906) 
(court cannot compel defendant to don a cap); Reyes v. Municipal Court, 41 P.R. 892 
(1931) (court cannot compel defendant to dishevel his hair). Likewise, the Supreme 
Court initially took a narrower view, holding, for example, that compelled production 
of documents violated privilege against self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886). 
53. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 38 N.E. 1003 (N.Y. 1894); White v. State, 62 
S.W. 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901); see also Magee v. State, 46 So. 529 (Miss. 1908) 
(Police officers have the right to acquire information from prisoners, even by force, and 
doing so does not violate privilege against self-incrimination). 
54. JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE§ 2263, at 3123 (1904). 
358 
[VOL. 33: 349, 1996] Constitutional Framework 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
more than testimonial communications. In Holt v. United States,55 for 
example, the Court held that compelling a prisoner to try on clothing in 
court did not raise a self-incrimination issue. 56 Similarly, in Schmerber 
v. California,57 the Court ruled that a compelled blood sample did not 
constitute testimony, and thus, no self-incrimination protection ap-
plied.58 The repeated references in both Holt and Schmerber to 
Wigmore's treatise reflects the importance the Court placed on his 
work.59 In fact, Justice Black, in his Schmerber dissent, openly 
criticized the Court for its over reliance on a single academic source and 
the Court's adoption of the "testimony" concept. Justice Black 
commented that even though "my admiration for Professor Wigmore's 
scholarship is great, I regret to see the word he used to narrow the Fifth 
Amendment protection play such a major part in any of this Court's 
opinions."60 
Subsequent Supreme Court consideration of self-incrimination cases 
has continued to strictly limit the privilege to "testimony".61 Based on 
the Court's belief that a verbal statement would almost always qualify 
as testimony, and thus fall within the privilege, the Court did not 
consider the testimony rule as a narrowing of the privilege.62 However, 
in reality, the Court's belief has not been supported by any court 
decisions based on an issue of a compelled voice exemplar. 
As a result, the state of the privilege against self-incrimination in 
modem American courts has been interpreted by at least one scholar as 
55. 218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
56. Id. at 252-53. 
57. 384 U.S. 757 (I 966). 
58. Id. at 760-65. 
59. See id. In considering Professor Wigmore's "testimony" theory distinction of 
the privilege, it is important to note his open disdain for the concept that self-
incrimination should ever be protected against in modern society. Wigmore denoted the 
privilege as "a relic of controversies and dangers which have disappeared" and argued 
that an "innocent" person would never need to assert the privilege and that the guilty 
should not be entitled to it. See John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 
HARV. L. REV. 71, 85-86 (1891). 
60. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting). 
61. "Testimony" has been defined as state compulsion of a defendant to disclose 
or communicate information of facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating 
evidence. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 20 I, 211 (1988). 
62. Id. at 213-14. 
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"empty of meaning."63 This conclusion seemingly goes too far in that 
it ignores, for example, the effectiveness of the privilege in mandating 
a grant of immunity to a witness from the state, prior to compelling the 
witness to incriminate herself.64 Still, the current application of the 
privilege by courts is much more narrow than it was during the 
nineteenth century.65 
C. Modern Framework 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been 
divided into five general components, "allowing (llnatural persons (2lto 
prohibit the introduction in a criminal proceeding (3lof self-incriminating 
disclosures (4lthat were obtained through 'compulsion' by the state and 
(
5lthat are testimonial in nature."66 The United States Supreme Court 
has addressed, within a constitutional framework, each of these factors 
and clarified how the factors must be applied.67 
Each of the first four factors will likely be satisfied in cases involving 
compelled voice exemplars. An individual criminal defendant will 
usually satisfy the first component per se. The Court has adhered to a 
narrow definition of "person," allowing only natural persons to assert a 
privilege against self-incrimination.68 Still, any individual criminal 
defendant, as a natural person, can assert a privilege.69 The second 
component, limiting the privilege to a criminal proceeding, has not been 
as narrowly construed. The Supreme Court has found the privilege to 
be applicable in any situation where incriminating testimony might be 
revealed and subsequently used in future criminal proceedings.70 
Because the exemplar procedure occurs during trial, the exemplar portion 
of a case will always fall within the "criminal proceeding" category. 
63. George C. Thomas III, Justice O'Connor's Pragmatic View of Coerced Se!f-
Incrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 117,117 (1991). 
64. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
65. See MCKELVEY, supra note 48, at 436; Synopsis, Privilege of Accused Against 
Corporal Examination, 16 HARV L. REV. 300, 300 (1903). 
66. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS§§ 15.01-15.02, at 323-24 (2d ed. 1986). 
67. For a complete discussion of the five factors, see Tartallo, supra note 49, at 
144-50. 
68. Thus, a corporation, association, or partnership cannot assert a privilege with 
regard to the entity. Still, any individual member may assert his or her own privilege 
on statements which might act to incriminate them as individuals. Id. at 144. 
69. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege as 
applicable only to the personal and private interests of individuals. United States v. 
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). Thus, the privilege is limited to instances when an 
individual person is being compelled to testify and when that testimony will incriminate 
that person. 
70. McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). 
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The third element of "incrimination" is a fact specific question, but 
would be satisfied in the case of compelled exemplars, due to the broad 
definition given to "incrimination." Testimony will be considered 
incriminating whenever it might "furnish a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute."71 Fourth, in the case of exemplars, the "compul-
sion" component is satisfied as a matter of course, as the exemplar 
situation arises only when the defendant is forced by the government 
with the permission of the court72 to provide a voice exemplar. 
Therefore, the fifth element of whether compelled evidence constitutes 
testimony is the crucial determinant, and as such has been frequently 
questioned. Based on the Supreme Court's adoption of the "testimony" 
distinction, "acts" have generally not been held to fall within the scope 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. For example, courts have allowed a 
defendant to be compelled to reenact a crime,73 dye her hair,74 furnish 
a handwriting sample,75 perform a sobriety field test,76 wear an outfit 
or costume77 and shave a beard or mustache.78 
71. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951). 
72. Of course, if the defendant freely volunteers to offer an exemplar, without any 
coercion or compulsion by the government, no constitutional right is implicated. See 
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). 
73. E.g., Avery v. Procunier, 750 F.2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1985) (forced 
reenactment of a robbery at the crime scene upheld by appellate court as non-testimonial, 
though the court discouraged such procedures). 
74. E.g., United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 
S. Ct. 2034 (1991 ). 
75. E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (I 967); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). 
76. The Supreme Court has held that compelled sobriety field tests are not barred 
by Fifth Amendment protection. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990). 
Because these tests do not infringe on a Fifth Amendment right, the suspect does not 
have a constitutional right to refuse to perform the tests prescribed, so a defendant's 
refusal to participate in such tests can be used against him in court. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1983). Finally, the lack of constitutional protection 
makes the requirement of providing Miranda warnings inapplicable. People v. Hager, 
69 N.Y.2d 141, 142 (1987); see also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 583. 
77. E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); United States v. 
Walitwarangkul, 808 F.2d 1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Robertson, 19 
F.3d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir. 1994). 
78. E.g., United States v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 1981) (taking hair samples from beard). 
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The courts faced a more difficult task in drawing a distinction between 
compelled verbal evidence and constitutionally protected testimony.79 
In order for verbal communication to be considered testimonial, the 
"communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual 
assertion or disclose information"80 that expresses "the contents of [ an 
individual's] mind."81 With few exceptions,82 courts have held that 
the forcing of repetition of phrases, either for identification purposes83 
or to refresh a witness' memory,84 does not constitute testimony 
because the compelled recitation of words or phrases by the defendant 
does not offer more than the physical evidence of the defendant's 
voice.85 Thus, under the current court treatment of the law, the 
privilege against self-incrimination will generally be inapplicable to 
compelled evidence, including exemplars.86 
Despite the extensive case law in this area, including multiple 
Supreme Court rulings denying the applicability of self-incrimination to 
compelled evidence,87 defense counsel continue to challenge the current 
79. See 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2265, at 
396 (1961). 
80. United States v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201,210 (1988). 
81. Id. at 210 n.9. 
82. See. e.g., United States v. Berberian, 767 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985) 
( defendant protected by privilege against self-incrimination from forced repetition of 
testimony given in a prior suppression hearing); State v. Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d 233 
(1980) (holding that the trial court's decision to force defendant in rape and burglary 
trial to repeat certain key phrases used by perpetrators during commission of the crimes 
was equivalent to compelling defendant to testify, and thus violated defendant's right 
against self-incrimination). 
83. E.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 7 (1973) (grand jury order forcing 
suspects to record voice found not to be a violation of Fifth Amendment); United States 
v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 249-51 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring defendant to repeat several 
phrases heard by police at the scene of the crime so jury could compare voice to tape 
recording not a Fifth Amendment violation because statements did not contain 
testimonial content). 
84. E.g., United States v. Silvestri, 790 F.2d 186, 189 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 857 (1986) (compelling defendant to identify himself to witness when witness 
forgot defendant's name not violative of Fifth Amendment because no testimonial 
content present within the statement). 
85. The applicability of a self-incrimination protection claim to compelled voice 
exemplars under the "testimony" standard has been realistically foreclosed by the United 
States Supreme Court, which held that voice exemplars do not constitute testimony and 
are not protected under self-incrimination. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 7. 
86. United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 991 (1983); But see Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d at 236-37 (trial court's decision to 
force defendant in rape and burglary trial to repeat certain key phrases used by 
perpetrators during commission of the crimes was equivalent to compelling defendant 
to testify, and thus violated defendant's right against self-incrimination). 
87. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 
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narrow formulation of the privilege.88 To a lay person the assertion of 
the privilege by counsel seems to be the clear and logical defense, based 
on the lay person's perception that the state cannot force a defendant to 
speak in court. 89 Further, the "testimony" limitation placed on Fifth 
Amendment protection has not been universally supported, with staunch 
and compelling criticisms of the limitation being asserted by prominent 
Supreme Court Justices.90 
Potentially, the continued zealous efforts of defense counsel to allege 
a self-incrimination violation will result in a reconsideration of the 
judicially created limitation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Beyond this, a couple of recent decisions reflect the fringe areas of the 
privilege that may still be asserted in the exemplar context. In 
particular, there are two narrow exceptions to the general trend of 
holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable to 
compelled evidence that may apply. 
The most significant exception is in the situation where the act of 
production of the evidence also acts as implicit testimony to an 
(I 910). 
88. See, e.g., Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial at 5-6, 
United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-1151-G), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 610 (1994); United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 1994); United States 
v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949 ( I 0th Cir. 1994). 
89. Discussion of the topic of this article with non-legal peers was universally 
responded to with the assertion that the exemplar was or should be protected by the Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination privilege. The general expectation was that the court 
could not force a defendant to say anything in court. While these discussions have no 
statistical reliability, they seem to reflect a common belief that a defendant cannot be 
forced to speak in court, regardless of technical legal standards which hold otherwise. 
90. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774-76 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing both the lack 
of clarity or precision that the "testimony" distinction provides, and the failure of the 
Court to adhere to the broad and liberal construction that the Court had previously given 
the self-incrimination privilege); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 33 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the word "testimony" is not included within the 
Fifth Amendment, and addressing the invasion of personality and will that a compelled 
voice exemplar accomplishes, stating that he could not "accept the notion that the 
Government can compel a man to cooperate affirmatively in securing incriminating 
evidence when that evidence could not be obtained without the cooperation of the 
suspect"). "[ A voice exemplar] is the kind of volitional act-the kind of forced 
cooperation by the accused-which is within the historical perimeter of the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. Our history and tradition teach and command that 
an accused may stand mute. The privilege means just that; not less than that." Wade, 
388 U.S. at 260-61 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Allowing the State to force the 
accused to repeat 'your money or your life' or words used in the commission of a 
violent crime like rape is intolerable under our constitutional system. Id. 
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incriminating fact. 91 For example, if the state compels the defendant 
to produce her copy of her tax forms, despite already having a copy, the 
state is using the defendant's production as implicit testimony of the 
authenticity of the government's copy of the tax form. 92 Voice 
exemplar situations in which the defendant is compelled to repeat words 
in Spanish or another foreign language arguably fall within this 
exception.93 
There is also support for the applicability of a Fifth Amendment 
privilege in a situation where the court compels a person to submit to 
testing, from which an effort will be made to determine physiological 
responses through a person's ability to recall information.94 For 
example, police questioning of a suspected drunk driver, which included 
a question regarding the year of suspect's sixth birthday, violated self-
incrimination privilege because such a response proffers more than a 
physiological exhibition.95 The Court distinguished the birthday 
question from other exemplar type situations on the basis of content. 
The birthday question was interpreted by the Court, in Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz, to be seeking the contents of the defendant's mind, requiring him 
to provide communication of information.96 This approach is particu-
larly applicable to compelled in-court exemplars and should be argued 
by defense counsel.97 
91. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
92. Id. 
93. Such exemplars seem to implicitly offer factual information, particularly the 
proficiency of the defendant to pronounce foreign language terms. This occurrence 
seems to fall within the standard the court applied in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582 (I 990). See infra note 94 and accompanying text. However, claims on this basis 
have been disregarded by the courts to this point. See, e.g., United States v. Olvera, 30 
F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). 
94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
95. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582; see also Gordon E. Hunt, Fifth Amendment Limitations 
on the Compelled Production of Evidence, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 811 (1987). 
96. 496 U.S. at 598-600. The Court found this despite the obvious fact that the 
defendant's answer to the birthday question was not the reason that the officers asked 
the question. Neither the State nor the officers of the State cared when the defendant's 
sixth birthday was; they were asking the question solely as a tool to test the cognitive 
abilities of the defendant, just as they had with the other sobriety tests. Id. 
97. It is difficult to reconcile the effect of the Pennsylvania v. Muniz distinction. 
The Court has attempted to draw a bright line, protecting the conveyance of information, 
but the rule ignores the dangers posed by the real results of the rule. A defendant has 
constitutional protection from giving completely innocuous, irrelevant answers to 
questions, but can be forced to repeat potentially inflammatory phrases in a courtroom. 
This approach was recently rejected in the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Olvera, 30 
F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). At trial, defense counsel 
attempted to assert that the requirement that the defendant speak in two languages 
constituted testimony, regardless of the content of the speech, by showing the 
defendant's bilingual ability. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
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Thus, even though historically the application of the privilege was not 
realistic, the Court's adoption of the blanket exclusion of exemplars from 
self-incrimination protection seems to go too far. In particular, the 
refusal to apply the privilege does not adequately recognize the actual 
effect on jurors from observation of in-court statements by a defendant. 
While some recent expansion of the privilege against self-incrimination 
has occurred, the current formulation of the privilege allows the state to 
compel profoundly incriminating evidence from the defendant. The state 
benefits significantly in having access to this evidence because without 
a narrow rule as to what constitutes self-incrimination the state would be 
left to prosecute without access to many of the sophisticated evidence 
sources available in the twentieth century. For example, if the Court had 
retained the expansive view of the privilege, the state would have no 
access to blood, fingerprints, DNA, hair, etc. These pieces of evidence 
are some of the most definitive and reliable evidence sources available, 
and without access to any of them the state would have difficulty 
convicting in any case. Still, that benefit alone is not a constitutionally 
valid basis for the "testimony" rule. Although, realistically, the benefits 
were probably considered in the Court's decision to interpret the 
privilege narrowly. Judicial motivations aside, within the relevant legal 
framework in its current state, attempts to assert a self-incrimination 
privilege in response to court demands for a voice exemplar will not 
generally succeed. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES IN THE 
CONTEXT OF COMPELLED EXEMPLARS 
If the Supreme Court continues to narrow the privilege against self-
incrimination, the next constitutional question is whether requiring 
defendants to provide voice exemplars in the context of in-court 
identification procedures violates due process guarantees.98 Unlike 
other rules of law, due process "is not a technical conception with a 
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."99 Instead, 
Defendant's Motions at 7, United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-
1151-G), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 610 (1994). 
98. See United States v. Basey, 613 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 
(I 979). 
99. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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due process represents "a profound attitude of fairness between man and 
man" and "is compounded of history, reason, the past course of 
decisions and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic 
faith." 100 While debate continues as to whether "due process" should 
include substantive protections, 101 procedurally the guarantee generally 
acts as a "catch-all" protection, limiting the government in favor of 
private rights. 102 Of course, the scope of the protection tends not to 
be fixed, but varies according to the personality and philosophy of the 
Court at the time. 103 
Because of the theoretical nature of due process, determination of its 
applicability is fact specific and must be considered within the context 
of the underlying right. Compelled exemplars must be considered within 
the due process context of both the prohibition of overly suggestive 
procedures and the preservation of the presumption of innocence. 
Unlike the self-incrimination area, the circuit courts have split on the due 
process question and the Supreme Court has declined its opportunities 
to address the question directly. 104 
A. History 
The guarantee of "due process of law" was first explicitly enumerated 
in statutes enacted during one of a series of reaffirmations of the Magna 
Carta during the fourteenth century. 105 No guidance was included 
regarding the specific meaning of the due process guarantee, leaving the 
100. Id. at 162-63. 
IO I. Compare Rosalie B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of 
Power: Has the Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 313 (1991) and Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (1990) with Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The 
Original Understanding, 4 CONST. COMMENT 339 ( 1987); Timothy L. Raschke Shattuck, 
Note, Justice Scalia 's Due Process Methodology: Examining Specific Traditions, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 2743 (1992). 
102. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 593-94 (1973). 
103. See VIRGINIA L. WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1932-1949; THE SUPREME 
COURT'S USE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL 272 (1951). 
I 04. "The Supreme Court has not addressed the possible prejudicial effect of live 
courtroom voice identification using threatening and vulgar language in the presence of 
the jury. However, the circuits that have confronted the issue of a voice exemplar in the 
jury's presence have allowed it." Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922,925 (5th Cir. 1993); 
But see United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d I 195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 
(1994); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1983). 
I 05. "That no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land 
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being 
brought to Answer by Due Process of the Law." STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER OF THE 
LIBERTIES OF LONDON, 28 Edward III, ch. iii, I Statutes of the Realm 345, ch. iii 
(1354), printed in MOTT, supra note I 02, at 4 n.11. 
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determination to judicial and scholarly interpretation. t06 The scope of 
the right was primarily defined by Sir Edward Coke in the Institutes, to7 
during the revival of the Magna Carta in the early seventeenth century. 
Coke's writings had a tremendous influence on the afsplication of due 
process up through the early eighteenth centu~f 8 While Coke 
ascribed a substantive component to due process,10 the actual applica-
tion of due process in England in the colonial period was primarily in 
the context of judicial procedure. 110 
The concept of due process, along with many of the English legal 
rights, was transplanted to America and formally guaranteed in charters 
and documents of the early American colonies. 111 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, most of the English colonies had included 
guarantees of due process in their fundamental laws. i tz Many of the 
procedural guarantees supported by the concept of due process were 
explicitly enumerated within the Bill of Rights of the United States 
Constitution. 113 Nonetheless, "due process" was explicitly included as 
well, 114 alluding to a belief by the Founders in the importance of the 
continued protection of individuals against a potentially tyrannical or 
coercive government. Despite the "Anglophobia" prevalent in America 
after the Revolution, American courts continued to rely heavily on 
British precedents on issues of due process. 115 However, the courts did 
not adhere rigidly to criminal due process precedent, but instead 
106. One of the most influential interpretations of the guarantee's application in 
England was made by Sir Edward Coke. Coke asserted that the terms "due process of 
law" and "the law of the land" were synonymous. This meant that due process was to 
include a trial's general conformity to the principles of common law, trial by jury by the 
peerage and lawful indictment. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 53 (1642), reprinted in 
MOTT, supra note I 02, at 77-78. 
]07. 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1642). 
I 08. MOTT, supra note I 02, at 78-83. 
109. Riggs, supra note IOI, at 959. 
110. MOTT, supra note I 02, at 83. 
111. The New York Charter of Libertyes and Privi/edges of 1683 protected colonists 
by requiring "due Course of Law," while the I 692 Massachusetts Bay Declaration of 
Righrs guaranteed "due process of law." Riggs, supra note 101, at 964-65. 
112. Id. at 961. 
113. For example, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a fair trial and 
the right to trial by jury are all procedural guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 
U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI. 
114. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
115. DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 53 (1992). 
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attempted to respond to their perceptions of the needs of a free 
society. 116 Overall, the focus of post-Revolutionary criminal law 
shifted emphasis from morality to concern over the protection of 
property and privacy. The courts' protection of procedural safeguards 
were central in this shift and, in the process, established definitions of 
due process that were readopted during the expansion of due process 
doctrine in the mid-twentieth century. 117 
The due process doctrine after the Civil War narrowed significantly, 
formally recognized by the courts, but not generally applied in support 
of the rights of individual defendants. JJS The progressive era move-
ment for social justice ended this period, as courts and legislatures began 
another redefinition of "due process."119 
The most significant example of this change in "due process" is 
reflected by the United States Supreme Court decision in Powell v. 
Alabama. 120 The Powell decision evidenced the Court's determination 
to test individual criminal cases conducted in the state courts under due 
process requirements and began the process of incorporating certain 
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the United States 
Constitution as binding on the states. 121 This process continued 
through the 1960's, when the selective incorporation doctrine was 
adopted and used to essentially complete the nationalization of the Bill 
of Rights. 122 
B. Modern Framework 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has not addressed the circuit 
court dispute over a due process limitation on voice exemplars. This 
failure is of particular concern, considering the influence this type of 
evidence tends to have and the frequency of cases concerning compelled 
evidence of this nature. 123 Due process consideration of compelled 
I 16. "'We consider it our duty,' concluded the Indiana Supreme Court in 1822, 'to 
give all weight to objections however nice and technical ... but we would guard against 
the evil of giving too easy an ear to such as rest on mere form of words, and can have 
no possible bearings on the merits of the case ... an evil which has long and justly been 
complained of as a disease of the law."' Id. at 52. 
117. Id. at 54-55. 
118. Id.at91. 
119. Id. 
120. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
121. WOOD, supra note 103, at 267. Powell was the method by which the Court 
opened the door to unlimited supervision of state criminal proceedings, a practice 
followed regularly until 1946. Id. at 267-68. 
122. BODENHAMER, supra note 115, at 104. 
123. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 881 (1981); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
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exemplars includes two distinct, yet closely related factors, First, due 
process provides protection against the tainting of a witness identification 
by overly suggestive pre-trial and in-court procedures. Second, due 
process acts to prevent the infringement on the presumption of innocence 
to which the defendant is entitled. 
1. Suggestiveness of Identification Procedures 
a. Pre-Trial Procedures 
The Court has addressed the tangential issue of "pre-trial suggestive-
ness" in the context of line-ups, and has attempted to define legal 
standards for what is essentially a fact specific determination. The Court 
originally addressed this issue in 1967 in Stovall v. Denno, 124 and 
focused on the fairness of the identification procedure under the "totality 
of the circumstances."125 Soon after, the Court, in a series of cases 
beginning with Neil v. Biggers, 126 retreated from this more stringent 
fairness standard. Instead, the Court emphasized that the reliability of 
the outcome was the central determinant, focusing on the primary 
concern of the due process clause, which is to protect against "a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-identification."127 The Biggers 
Court did not provide a bright-line definition of "overly suggestive 
479 U.S. 1038 (1987); United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, I 15 
S. Ct. 610 (1994). 
124. 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (acknowledged the validity ofan independent due process 
suggestiveness claim, but found it inapplicable based on the trial record without 
elaborating on the basis for the ruling). 
125. Id. at 301-02. 
126. 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (suggestive line-up at police station combined with a 
seven month delay between incident and identification did not pose a substantial 
likelihood of misidentification, based on the detailed description given by the witness 
and other facts supporting the validity of the identification); see also Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (clarifying the central importance of misidentification 
to the Biggers standard). 
127. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
384 (1968)). The danger is best expressed by Justice Brennan, who notes that "[i]t is 
a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the 
[pre-trial] lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the 
issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practicable 
purposes be determined there and then, before the trial." United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218,229 (1967) (quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part 
I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479,482 (1963)). 
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procedures," but instead defined the standard vaguely, holding that the 
central consideration in determining whether to exclude evidence as 
violative of due process is whether "under the 'totality of the 
circumstances' the identification was reliable, even though the confronta-
tion procedure was suggestive."128 
The Court reaffirmed Biggers' focus on reliability as the central 
determinant of admissibility in Manson v. Brathwaite, 129 and clarified 
the test to be applied in analyzing whether a procedure was 
impermissibly suggestive. 130 The "Biggers-Brathwaite" standard enacts 
a two-step analysis. First, the defendant must prove that the identifica-
tion procedure used was impermissibly suggestive. Second, if this 
burden is met, the court must determine whether such suggestiveness 
created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This is 
accomplished by balancing five enumerated factors that weigh in support 
of the reliability of the identification against the suggestiveness of the 
procedure. 131 
b. In-Court Procedures 
The Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the applicability of 
the Biggers-Brathwaite test to the question of in-court suggestive 
identifications. 132 The majority position among the circuits that have 
considered the issue has been that the Biggers-Brathwaite pre-trial 
standard is not constitutionally mandated for in-court identifications. 133 
Unlike pre-trial identification, in-court identifications occur in a 
courtroom while the relevant witness is under oath, subject to cross-
128. Id. at 199. 
129. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
130. Id. at 114. 
131. The Brathwaite Court adopted five factors, first discussed in Biggers, as 
elements in consideration ofreliability. These factors include: C11the witness' opportunity 
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; C'1the witness' degree of attention at the 
time of the crime; c31the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; C41the 
witness' level of certainty when identifying the suspect at the confrontation; and csithe 
length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors, the court 
must weigh the "corrupting effect" of the suggestive identification. Id. at l l 4. 
132. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1038 (1987) ("[N]o holding of the Supreme Court nor of this circuit has 
mandated such a requirement."). 
133. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 
(1987). The Domina court recognized that suggestiveness within the in-court 
identification process might require court protection, but held that such protection was 
within the court's discretion. Id. at 1369. The Domina court also noted that only the 
Eleventh circuit had indicated that the Biggers standard applied to in-court identifica-
tions. Id. at 1368. 
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examination, and while under close observation by the trier of fact. 134 
The primary rationale behind the Biggers-Brathwaite test is to avoid the 
danger of an irreparable misidentification being relied on by the trier of 
fact. This danger is decreased significantly by the protections provided 
by courtroom procedures and by the presence of the jury at the 
procedure. The jury may consider the level of suggestiveness used as 
a factor to consider in gauging the reliability of the witness. These 
protections significantly decrease the danger of misidentification in the 
in-court context without having to apply the Biggers-Brathwaite pre-trial 
standard. 
Even in those jurisdictions that recognize Biggers-Brathwaite as the 
required test for suggestive in-court identification, 135 the severity of the 
suggestiveness required to satisfy Biggers-Brathwaite leads to exclusion 
only in the most egregious situations. 136 These courts concur with the 
majority position that in-court procedures provide increased protection 
against over-suggestiveness from pre-trial procedures. First, neither the 
solitary presence of the defendant in the courtroom nor the prompting by 
opposing counsel lends credibility to the accuracy or objectivity of a 
witness' identification, and thus, neither issue poses a significant 
danger.137 Second, the defendant is protected because a witness 
making in-court identifications does so under oath, in the presence of the 
trier of fact, and while subject to cross examination. 138 Third, to 
determine whether due process was violated, courts tend to consider all 
other evidence offered by the government that substantiates the element 
of identity, to assure that the proper identification was made. 139 As a 
result, the trier of fact in an in-court identification, unlike in a pre-trial 
procedure, is able to determine the appropriate level of reliability to be 
134. See id. at 1368-69. 
135. See, e.g., Code v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 1316, 1319 (I Ith Cir. 1984); State 
v. Jason, 392 A.2d I 086, I 089-90 (Me. 1978). 
136. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 261; Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due 
Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. I (1992). 
137. See United States v. Anderson, 933 F.2d 1261, 1275 (5th Cir. 1991). 
138. See Domina, 784 F.2d 1371-72. 
139. The more collaborating evidence that is offered by the government, the less the 
danger posed by in-court identification procedures. See United States v. Robertson, 19 
F.3d 1318, 1323-24 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Davila, 964 F.2d 778, 782 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, I 13 S. Ct. 438 (1992). 
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placed with the identifying witness' testimony, significantly reducing any 
danger of suggestiveness that might have otherwise occurred. 140 
In addition, appellate courts have noted that to decrease the level of 
suggestiveness defense counsel may request leave to place defendant 
elsewhere in the courtroom or to conduct an in-court lineup. 141 Of 
course, the trial court's decision of such a request is entirely within that 
court's discretion,142 although at least one appellate court has encour-
aged the use of protective procedures when feasible to do so without 
courtroom disruption. 143 
Despite the many protections afforded by in-court procedures, some 
aspects of in-court identifications pose unique and significant dangers to 
a defendant's due process rights. For example, unlike out-of-court 
lineups or other identification procedures, in-court identifications are 
inherently suggestive by the mere fact that the defendant is sitting at the 
defense table. The defendant is isolated from all other persons, as the 
sole focus of the government's case, when the witness is asked to 
identify the person she saw. 144 The nature of this situation increases 
the danger of false identification of the defendant145 and may tend to 
misdirect the jury to overvalue untrustworthy testimony.146 These 
dangers are more striking in the context of voice exemplars, as only the 
defendant is compelled to speak. This essentially guarantees that the 
witness will identify the defendant regardless of the true accuracy of that 
witness' recollection. The most significant protection from these dangers 
140. United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1987). 
141. United States v. Murdock, 928 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1991); But cf United 
States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981) (defense counsel's 
replacement of the defendant with a different person at defense table without the 
knowledge of the court in an attempt to increase the likelihood of faulty in-court witness 
identification testimony was punishable as criminal contempt). 
142. The trial court's decision is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. United 
States v. McDonald, 441 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971). 
143. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 420-21 (3rd Cir. 1985) (while 
allowing an in-court lineup would have been preferable, the trial court's refusal was not 
an abuse of discretion requiring reversal). 
144. The witness will likely look first to the defense table, where the defendant is 
sitting in relative isolation. Thus, the usual physical setting of the courtroom may itself 
provide a suggestive setting for the identification. United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 
1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 9 I 2 (1971 ). 
145. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1038 (1987). 
146. Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological 
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 994 
( 1977). However, problems of perception and memory play an even greater role in 
producing inaccurate information than does the use of suggestive procedures, and these 
cannot be overcome by cross-examination. Id. 
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is the defendant's access to cross-examination, 147 but realistically this 
right may not be enough to overcome the danger. Thus, continued 
concern over the danger of in-court identification procedures is justified, 
and courts should continue to minimize the dangers to the extent 
possible, under both the relevant evidence rules and other protections 
available within the discretion of the court. For example, courts could 
avoid suggestiveness problems by simply requiring witness identification 
of voice exemplars be conducted out-of-court. However, courts have 
tended not to adopt such protective measures in the voice exemplar 
context, nor have courts excluded other types of in-court identifications 
on constitutionally based over-suggestiveness claims except in cases of 
outrageous misconduct by the state. 148 
2. Presumption of Innocence 
In essence, presumption of innocence is the constitutional guarantee 
that the defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty and 
that the fact finding process must not taint this presumption. 149 While 
the actual effect of a particular procedure on the jurors cannot necessari-
ly be determined, the courts must apply close judicial scrutiny to 
procedures that might cause "deleterious effects."15° For example, 
requiring a defendant wearing a ski mask and holding a toy gun to stand 
up in court and shout "[g]ive me your money or I am going to blow you 
up" would be inconsistent with the guarantee of a presumption of 
innocence. 151 Presumption of innocence protection seeks to keep the 
trier of fact from drawing suspicions or inferences from the defendant's 
147. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1372 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1038 (1987). 
148. Compare State v. Jason, 392 A.2d 1086 (Me. 1978) (impermissibly suggestive 
to arrange in-court line-up in the presence of five-year-old child prosecutrix, remove her 
from the courtroom, and add defendant to line-up and then have prosecutor and court 
personnel "pressure" her to identify "the man that did it") with United States v. 
Murdock, 928 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1991) (non-detailed and inaccurate identifications by 
three witnesses of the defendant were held to be reliable despite fact that defendant was 
the only person at defense table and the only African-American in the courtroom). 
149. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). 
150. Id. at 504. 
151. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d I 195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
610 (1994); United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
881 (1981) (Oakes, J., dissenting); United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1374 (9th 
Cir 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987). 
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arrest, indictment and presence in court, while reaching a legal 
conclusion based solely on the relevant legal evidence offered at 
trial. 152 Certain courtroom procedures have been found to violate the 
presumption, including requiring a defendant to wear prison clothing at 
trial, 153 shackling or gagging a defendant during trial without 
cause,154 deploying excessive security forces in the courtroom,155 
permitting members of the court to encourage a witness to identify the 
perpetrator of a crime,156 or allowing courtroom observers to wear anti-
rape buttons during a rape trial. 157 
Whether compelling a defendant to restate words heard at the scene 
of the crime is unduly suggestive of guilt, and thus violative of the 
presumption of innocence, continues to be disputed among the courts. 
The most recent circuit court consideration of this issue was United 
States v. Olvera, 158 in which the court held that voice exemplars in 
general have the potential to violate due process, and that due process 
was violated in that particular case. 159 The court emphasized that the 
risk would be diminished substantially if neutral words were used. 160 
The court also discussed the importance of providing the jury with a 
clear explanation that the exemplar was necessary for identification and 
had no other relevance. 161 In addition, the court noted that the defen-
dant had exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, which 
substantially increased the risk that the words the defendant had been 
forced to speak would stand out in the jurors' memories and affect the 
ultimate assessment of the defendant's culpability. 162 Finally, the court 
stated that the failure of the government to ask the witness, after the 
defendant's statement, whether the defendant was the same person, 
152. John H. Wigmore, The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, reprinted 
in JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 
559 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898). 
153. Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1989). 
154. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1970). 
155. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986). 
156. State v. Jason, 392 A.2d 1086, l 089 (Me. 1978). 
157. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 1990). 
158. 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at I 197 (quoting United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987)). 
161. Olvera, 30 F.2d at 1197. However, the Ninth Circuit court failed to address 
the fact that the trial judge in Olvera gave a seemingly sufficient explanation to the jury, 
immediately after the defendant's repetition of the phrases. The judge explained that the 
defendant had not been forced to testify because his exemplars were not testimony and 
were only for the purpose of witness recollection for identification purposes. Direct 
Examination of Rosa Ybarra at 11-27 line 18 to 11-28 line 17, United States v. Olvera, 
30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.) (No. 91-1151-G). 
162. Olvera, 30 F.3d at 1197 (9th Cir.). 
374 
[VOL. 33: 349, 1996] Constitutional Framework 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
further increased the prejudicial danger. 163 Without follow-up, the 
defendant's statements may have appeared to the jury to be no more than 
a demonstration of the defendant's commission of the robbery. 164 
The Olvera decision forged into a rarely considered constitutional 
territory by its acceptance of a presumption of innocence due process 
claim for a compelled voice exemplar. Prior to Olvera, a substantial 
majority of jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit, 165 had refused to 
accept due process doctrine as a valid protection from compelled voice 
exemplars. However, these rejected due process claims were argued on 
suggestiveness grounds, not presumption of innocence. 166 
While defense counsel should pursue a presumption of innocence 
claim as a defense to compelled exemplars, the Olvera decision does not 
provide a useful framework for the assertion. 167 The North Carolina 
Court of Appeal, in State v. Locklear, 168 was the first court to consider 
a presumption of innocence claim based on the factors emphasized in the 
Olvera decision. The Locklear court ruled that no due process violation 
occurred because the trial court had explained to the jury the reason for 
requiring the defendant to repeat certain words and because the 
prosecutor had asked the witness, after the defendant spoke, whether that 
was the voice she had heard during the commission of the crime. 169 
163. Id. at 1198. 
164. Id. 
165. United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
I 038 (1987); United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
U.S. 912 (1971). The Ninth Circuit in Domina did allude to a presumption of innocence 
claim, but disregarded the claim without explanation. Domina, 784 F.2d at 1371-72. 
166. E.g., Domina, 784 F.2d 1361; United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981); United States v. Leone, 823 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1991). 
167. The Olvera decision is not unique in this regard, The few courts that have 
considered a presumption of innocence limitation to compelled exemplars have been 
unable to set out a workable standard. For example, the Court of Appeal in Ohio found 
a due process violation under facts mirroring the courtroom procedure used in Olvera. 
State v. Naylor, 70 Ohio App. 2d 233 (1980), The court did so without any direct case 
law in support of the due process issue. The only case law offered on due process was 
a general cite to the United States Supreme Court decisions in Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 (1952) and Breithaupt v, Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), which set out the 
infrequently applied "shocks the conscience" standard for due process. Id. at 23 7. In 
essence, the Naylor court sought out and reached the correct result, but did so without 
a clear legal framework. 
168. 450 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). 
169. Id. at 518-19. 
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Formalistically these differences may seem significant, but in actuality 
the realistic difference in effect on the jury's perception of the 
defendant's presumption of innocence is minimal. 170 The "almost 
Kafka-esque" scene of a defendant being forced to repeat inflammatory 
or threatening phrases will undermine the defendant's presumption of 
innocence, regardless of the efforts made to "explain" the process. 171 
By forcing the defendant to utter criminal statements in court, the court 
isolates the defendant from all others in the courtroom and inevitably 
associates the defendant with the charged conduct. 172 As a result, the 
defendant is branded with "an unmistakable mark of guilt" in the jurors' 
eyes.113 
As previously discussed, defense counsel should continue to assert 
presumption of innocence guarantees in their opposition to compelled 
exemplars. However, they should also be aware that the Olvera 
decision, while helpful and logically sound, is not fully effective in 
securing due process rights. The Olvera decision focused on formal 
procedural protections instead of basing the standard on a measure of the 
actual effect of the procedure on the defendant. By some accounts, such 
formalistic treatment of due process in the current United States legal 
system has resulted in the negation of almost all of the protection that 
due process was originally intended to provide. 174 
Thus, the presumption of innocence implicit in the Due Process Clause 
should clearly protect defendants from being compelled to repeat 
inflammatory or emotionally charged words under the guise of witness 
identification. 175 However, despite its logical application, defense 
counsel will likely continue to face difficulty in expanding such 
170. "The actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot 
always be fully determined. But this Court has left no doubt that the probability of 
deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny." Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). 
171. See Jim Doyle, Judge's Order to Talk Leads to Reversal, S.F. CHRON., July 
28, 1994, at A23. 
172. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
610 (1994). 
173. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 571 (1986)). 
174. Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 261. 
175. There is no sound reason why a defendant should have to repeat the same 
words heard at a crime scene in order for a witness to perform a voice identification. 
See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1038 ( I 987) ("There is no doubt that it would have been a far better procedure to 
have had Domina repeat neutral words . . . . "). This is particularly true of cases in 
which prosecutors require an exemplar despite other available methods of identification. 
E.g., State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). At minimum, the 
Supreme Court should grant certiorari on this issue to provide protection against 
potential prosecutorial manipulation. 
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protection in the area of voice exemplars due to the reliance on formal 
procedural safeguards to protect constitutional rights. 
III. OTHER POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE OPTIONS WITHIN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPELLED EXEMPLARS 
A. Sixth Amendment Guarantees 
The most significant area of Sixth Amendment applicability is in the 
context of the absence of assistance of counsel. This problem generally 
arises when a suspect is included in a pre-trial lineup for witness 
identification purposes. 176 For example, the right to counsel is guaran-
teed for pre-trial lineups because of "the accused's inability effectively 
to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred."177 In general, the 
determination of whether a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation has 
occurred depends on the court's decision of whether the lack of counsel 
occurred at a "critical" stage in the proceedings. 178 
The Supreme Court has held that pre-trial production and testing of 
physical evidence is generally not within the "critical stages" as defined 
under the current standard. 179 The distinction that the Court makes 
centers on whether a particular governmental action, taken with defense 
counsel absent, might derogate from the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. 180 Unlike out-of-court line-ups, the Court determined that only 
a minimal risk was posed by pre-trial compelled physical evidence as the 
adversarial nature of the trial system affords the defendant the opportuni-
ty to "correct" any unrepresentative sample. 181 Thus, in the Court's 
view, the defendant's right to a fair trial is not jeopardized by the 
176. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 271 (I 967); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967); Catherine A. Rivlin, Note, Showdown Over the 
California Showup, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 135 (1983). 
177. Wade, 388 U.S. 231-32. 
178. Id. at 227. 
179. Id. at 227-28; Gilbert, 388 U.S. 267 (1967). 
180. Wade, 388 U.S. 228. 
181. The accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the 
Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the 
Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. 
Gilbert, 388 U.S. 267; Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28. Even though pre-trial identification 
does not require presence of counsel, the admissibility of the evidence is still governed 
by and subject to the due process standard. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 
(1972) (plurality opinion). 
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absence of counsel in pre-trial production of physical evidence. 
However, pre-trial voice exemplar production, if conducted like a 
confrontational line-up, should be considered a critical stage for the same 
reasons as line-ups in general. 182 The distinction is between a voice 
exemplar merely recorded for later use and a witness identification of an 
exemplar at that particular time and location. The former will be 
allowed, just as any other taking of physical evidence; the latter probably 
not.1s1 
Defense counsel should argue that the compelling of a voice exemplar 
from the defendant infringes on her right to effective assistance of 
counsel in two ways. First, forcing a defendant to speak as part of the 
state's case improperly makes the defendant a witness for the state. 
Second, if the court finds that the exemplar can be compelled, defense 
counsel should argue that a limiting instruction to the jury is a minimum 
requirement to protect the defendant's right to effective counsel. Still, 
as a general matter, this Sixth Amendment guarantee will not be a major 
issue in the normal in-court compelled exemplar case since defense 
counsel will be present to protect the defendant's rights at that time. 184 
B. Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy protection has been applied 
according to a court's determination of whether a reasonable person 
would have an expectation of privacy against the particular state action 
taken. 185 The central function of the Fourth Amendment is to "protect 
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State."186 The courts, primarily relying on Katz v. United States, 181 
182. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
183. But see Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 784-85 (2nd Cir. 1981 ), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 948 (1982) (voice identification admissible at trial despite lack of the presence 
of counsel during pre-trial interview); United States v. Depree, 553 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th 
Cir.) (no right to counsel at pre-indictment voice identification), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
986 (1977). 
184. The effectiveness of defense counsel may still be challenged under the standard 
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), if the defendant can sustain 
such a claim under the particular facts of the case. 
I 85. This is a two-tier analysis. First, the court must determine whether the initial 
"seizure" of the person by government agents satisfied constitutional standards. See 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Second, any subsequent search or seizure 
must be scrutinized under the relevant test. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). 
186. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
187. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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have attempted to draw the line between those aspects of the defendant 
that are normally open to the public and those that are not. 188 
Applicability of a Katz approach in a particular case is entirely fact 
dependant, depending on the reasonable expectation of a privacy right 
and the invasiveness of the particular state act in that case. 189 In 
general, physical characteristics, and in particular voice exemplars, are 
not protected because they are not private in nature. 190 Physical 
characteristics are continually exposed to public observation, and no 
expectation exists that others will not observe these features. 191 The 
tone and manner of a person's voice, unlike the content of a conversa-
tion, is repeatedly produced for others to hear. 192 As such, courts have 
deemed these to be merely identifying characteristics, not private aspects 
of one's person. 193 In comparison, the taking of pubic hair samples or 
of X-rays does infringe on an individual's legitimate expectations of 
privacy and would thus be subject to Fourth Amendment require-
ments.194 Voice exemplars do not involve the level of intrusiveness 
of these latter categories and should not be barred by federal Constitu-
tional guarantees of privacy. 
In a few states, however, protection has been afforded for voice 
exemplars under a right to privacy guarantee under the particular state's 
I 88. The essence of the distinction is the privacy expectation of an individual. See, 
e.g., In Re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, Illinois Supreme Court v. Marquez, 604 
N.E.2d 929,934,939 (Ill. 1992). Individuals do not have privacy expectations regarding 
readily observable physical characteristics, but most individuals would have the 
expectation that the taking of blood or hair invades their privacy. Id.; see also 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-69. 
189. The extent of privacy guaranteed under the United States Constitution depends 
on the particular facts of the case. Also, state constitutions may provide broader 
protection of privacy, either explicitly or as interpreted by the state courts. For example, 
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Constitution is broader in scope than the 
United States Constitution and guarantees a zone of personal privacy such that the taking 
of physical samples from a suspect requires probable cause. May 1991 Will County 
Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d at 934, 939. 
190. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 9 (1973); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
191. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
192. "No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the 
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a 
mystery to the world." Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14. 
193. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1312 n.l (7th Cir. 
1988). 
194. E.g., United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341 (I Ith Cir.) (X-rays), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977) (pubic 
hair). 
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constitution. 195 If protected by the state's privacy guarantee, a subpoe-
na based on probable cause to take such a sample would likely be 
required. 196 Assertion of a privacy infringement claim by defense 
counsel based on a compelled voice exemplar would have to be founded 
in a state guarantee. 
C. Other Constitutional Approaches 
Other constitutional approaches have been applied to compelled 
production of voice exemplars and similar evidence, but have been 
summarily disregarded. For example, one case turned on a claim by a 
criminal defendant that requiring him to demonstrate his voice for 
identification purposes would deny him his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial; a claim that the court held was clearly without merit. 197 
Likewise, a few cases have been considered under an equal protection 
analysis, though none have resulted in the finding of a constitutional 
violation. 198 
D. Non-Constitutional Protection 
Outside of constitutional guarantees, state court evidentiary procedures 
generally include a probative danger balancing standard which allows 
trial judges, in their discretion, to balance the probative value against the 
prejudicial danger of a particular piece of evidence. 199 Federal rules 
195. See, e.g., supra note 185; CAL. CONST. art. I,§§ I, 24. 
196. See In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, Illinois Supreme Court, 604 
N.E.2d 929 (Ill. I 992). 
197. State v. Cary, 230 A.2d 384, 394 (N.J. 1967). 
198. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923,946 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting 
defendant's argument that being required to participate in lineup and voice identification 
denies equal protection, even though those defendants who can afford bail do not have 
to participate), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967); Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420, 420-21 
(9th Cir.) (requiring a suspect detained on a criminal charge to participate in a police 
lineup and to speak for identification purposes did not violate the constitutional 
guarantee of the equal protection of the law), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 922, reh 'g denied, 
389 U.S. 893 (1967). 
199. "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing 
the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL. Evm. CODE§ 352 (West 1996); see, e.g., 
People v. Holt, 28 Cal. App. 3d 343, 104 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 
921 (I 973) (trial court was within its discretion to exclude from evidence exhibition that 
required defendant to stand, wear a hat, hold a gun and repeat the words uttered by the 
robber under evidence code section 352) (disapproved on other grounds in Evans v. 
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr. 
121 (I 974)); State v. Miller, 467 P.2d 683, 685 (Or. Ct. App. I 970). 
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Of course, counsel should always consider a motion under the 
applicable evidence code section to exclude compelled evidence and 
exemplars, if such a claim can be reasonably made. Exemplar evidence 
is not admissible as of right for either party, but is in the sound 
discretion of the court to permit after considering the evidence's weight, 
relevance, reliability, and the prejudicial danger that it poses.201 As 
such, success on a suppression motion based on the applicable rules of 
evidence will depend on the particular facts of a case. 
It would seem that a compelled voice exemplar situation would be 
barred in many cases under the relevant evidence standards because the 
production of a voice exemplar exposes the defendant to significant 
prejudice. First, jurors are most likely going to consider the content of 
the words spoken and weigh the statement as evidence, even if 
admonished against doing so. In fact, the admonishment by the judge 
might even reinforce and highlight the exemplar in the minds of some 
of the jurors, resulting in still more consideration being given to it 
during deliberations. Second, whether or not jurors consider the content, 
the unusual nature of the exhibition, as compared to more mundane trial 
practice, will likely result in the event receiving undue weight by the 
jurors during deliberations and may result in impermissibly swaying their 
decision, consciously or not.202 
In addition, in many cases no significant probative value is offered by 
witness identifications of compelled exemplars. For example, in cases 
200. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403. Many states, including 
Colorado, Delaware, Utah and Hawaii, have adopted the text of rule 403 as enumerated. 
See 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5211 n.31 (I 978 & Supp. 1995). 
201. See People v. Williams, 559 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1990), ajf'd, 996 F.2d 1481 
(2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. !073 (1994). 
202. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
6!0 (1994) (When defendant exercises the right not to testify, the only statements the 
jurors hear from the defendant are those that mimic the words of a criminal during a 
crime. "[T]hese statements thus are likely to remain prominent in jurors' memories and 
to dominate their perception of the defendant."); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-
05 (1976) ("[T]he constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such 
distinctive, identifiable attire [prison clothing] may affect a juror's judgment ... [and] 
an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play."). 
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where alternative means of identification can and have been utilized, no 
benefit at all seems to be gained by use of the exemplar process. Still, 
courts retain the discretion to demand voice exemplars in such cases and 
continue to demand exemplar production, despite the redundancy in 
doing so.203 Further, even in those cases where the probative value of 
witness identifications is high, the requirement that the defendant mimic 
the exact words used at the scene of the crime, instead of neutral words, 
does not increase the probative value.204 
Thus, one might expect courts to routinely refuse prosecution requests 
for in-court compelled voice exemplars under the relevant evidentiary 
standard. Instead, courts often allow compelled exemplar evidence 
unless an infringement of constitutional magnitude is shown, presumably 
due to the misperception that all witness identification evidence has high 
probative value. So, while assertion of an evidentiary claim is crucial 
in the context of compelled exemplars, defense counsel must also focus 
on drawing their case within constitutional protections if they want to 
maximize their chances of avoiding a compelled voice exemplar.205 
CONCLUSION 
The clear and logical application of constitutional limitations is 
particularly crucial in the voice exemplar area because of both the 
profound effects such exemplars can have on the jury and the lack of 
effective non-constitutional protections against exemplars. Defense 
counsel have multiple constitutional options to argue, but no clear 
constitutional standard has yet been offered by the courts. Instead, most 
potential protections, both constitutional and evidentiary, have been 
drawn against the defendant in favor of the state, with the courts 
favoring the interest of the state in incarcerating criminals over the 
countervailing liberty interests of individuals.206 
203. E.g., State v. Locklear, 450 S.E.2d 516, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (despite the 
witness' statement that no voice exemplar was necessary, the trial court's demand that 
the defendant provide an exemplar was still within its discretion); United States v. 
Leone, 823 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir. 1987) ( despite fact that witness had already identified 
defendant, forcing defendant to repeat words uttered during the commission of the crime 
did not violate defendant's rights). 
204. See United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987) ("There is no doubt that it would have been a far better 
procedure to have had Domina repeat neutral words .... "). 
205. Also, by raising constitutionally based objections to the use of a voice 
exemplar, defense counsel may convince the court not to allow the exemplar in a 
discretionary ruling even if no constitutional bar is found by the court. 
206. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
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As long as the Supreme Court retains the testimony versus communi-
cation distinction, the privilege against self-incrimination offers little 
protection in the area of compelled exemplars. The testimony standard 
is open to criticism, but to this point has been steadfastly adhered to by 
the courts. 
Due process doctrine, on the other hand, should provide protection in 
exemplar situations. Procedurally, current treatment of exemplars seems 
to allow the state exemplar evidence that is denied to the defendant. 
Substantively, the prejudice inherent in compelled exemplar scenarios 
clearly has the potential to violate due process.207 The Ninth Circuit 
reached the correct result in its decision in Olvera, but the standard set 
out by the court unduly emphasized formal procedural guidelines which 
seem to minimize the real dangers to be avoided. Likewise, other courts 
have generally relied on formalistic distinctions, ignoring the profound 
prejudicial effect exemplars can have on jurors. As a result, counsel and 
trial courts are left to continue to struggle with Due Process applicability 
on a case by case basis until the Supreme Court grants certiorari on this 
issue. 
MICHAEL A. CONNOR 
207. United States v. Olvera, 30 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 
(1994). 
383 
